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Abstract: Right-wing populists across many western countries have markedly intensified their
references to Christianity in recent years. However, Christian communities’ reactions to such de-
velopments often vary significantly, ranging from disproportionate support in some countries to
outspoken opposition in others. This paper explores the role of structural factors, and in particular of
Church–State relations, in accounting for some of these differences. Specifically, this article explores
how Church–State relations in Germany and the United States have produced different incentives
and opportunity structures for faith leaders when facing right-wing populism. Based on quantitative
studies, survey data, and 31 in-depth elite interviews, this research suggests that whereas Germany’s
system of “benevolent neutrality” encourages highly centralised churches whose leaders perceive
themselves as integral part and defenders of the current system, and are therefore both willing and
able to create social taboos against right-wing populism, America’s “Wall of separation” favours a
de-centralised religious marketplace, in which church leaders are more prone to agree with populists’
anti-elitist rhetoric, and face higher costs and barriers against publicly condemning right-wing pop-
ulism. Taking such structural factors into greater account when analysing Christian responses to
right-wing populism is central to understanding current and future dynamics between politics and
religion in western democracies.
Keywords: right-wing populism; religion; nationalism; secularization; church and state; Trumpism;
US constitution; civil religion; AfD
1. Introduction
This paper compares the cases of Germany and the United States to investigate
how a country’s institutional settlement of Church–State relations can shape Christian
communities’ responses to right-wing populist politics. Germany and the United States are
representative of many western countries in having recently experienced a surge of right-
wing populist movements, which prominently display Christian symbols and use Christian
language (Thielmann 2017; Whitehead and Perry 2020; Elcott et al. 2021). Pro-Trump rioters
parading oversized crosses and Jesus flags during the storming of the Capitol in January
2021, or Germany’s far-Alternative for Germany (AfD) stylising itself as the defender
of Germany’s “Judeo-Christian heritage” are two of the most recent examples of this
development (Deutschlandfunk 2018; Cremer 2021b; Green 2021). However, while right-
wing populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic appear determined to use Christian
symbols and language in order to appeal to voters’ concerns about national and cultural
identity (Marzouki et al. 2016; Brubaker 2017; Haynes 2020), the reactions of German and
American Christian communities to such references are strikingly different. In the US,
White Christians supported Donald Trump’s right-wing populist campaign at record-levels
in the 2016 and 2020 elections and many American Christian leaders appeared at least tacitly
supportive of the Trump administration (P. S. Gorski 2020; Whitehead and Perry 2020). By
contrast, German Protestants and Catholics were significantly less likely to vote for the AfD
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than irreligious voters, and Germany’s churches have emerged as some of the far right’s
most outspoken public critics (Cremer 2018; Siegers and Jedinger 2020; Elcott et al. 2021).
This paper seeks to better understand the dynamics behind such differing responses in
German and American Christian communities to the populist right, with a particular focus
on the role of Church–State relations.
In the academic literature, different responses by Christian communities have often
led to opposing interpretations of the relationship between religion and right-wing pop-
ulism in general. Some interpret right-wing populism as a movement largely fuelled by
White Christian Nationalism (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Whitehead and Perry 2020). By
contrast, others point to right-wing populists’ poor performance among Christian voters
in some countries to speak of a “religious vaccination effect”, “religion gap” or “religious
immunity” to right-wing populism (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Immerzeel et al. 2013;
Montgomery and Winter 2015; Siegers and Jedinger 2020). While there has been little
comparative analysis of the dynamics behind such variations, some scholars have recently
made suggestions as to why Christian communities in some countries may appear to
disproportionately support right-wing populist politics while their coreligionists in compa-
rable countries disproportionately reject them. In the US, for instance, there is a growing
literature pointing to the historical prevalence and theological roots of White Christian
Nationalism and populism in American Christianity, which can be traced back at least
back to the great awakenings of the 18th and 19th century, and which may have rendered
American Evangelicals more receptive to Trumpism (Stein 1992; Fea 2018; P. Gorski 2019;
Whitehead and Perry 2020). Meanwhile, in Europe scholars have explored the strategies
and rhetoric of right-wing populists themselves, finding that under the surface of Christian
symbolism and identitarian references, many western European right-wing populists,
actually defend increasingly secularist policies and merely “hijack” Christian symbols as a
cultural identity marker again Islam, which may lead European Christian communities to
oppose them (Marzouki et al. 2016; Brubaker 2017; Haynes 2019; Ozzano 2021). Finally,
some authors have stressed the importance of political party affiliation, which may make
many European Christian communities unavailable towards the populist right as they
are already bound to Christian democratic or conservative competitor parties, whereas in
the US traditional party allegiance to the GOP might have pushed American Christians
towards Donald Trump (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Montgomery and Winter 2015; Siegers
and Jedinger 2020).
Each of these avenues of research contributes critical insights. However, one key
variable in understanding Christian responses to right-wing populism has so far often
been left out of the debate: the institutional settlement of Church–State relations. This is
remarkable as research has shown that Church–State relations can critically influence a
country’s religious landscape, and also how religious communities engage in the political
arena (Dolezal et al. 2010; Minkenberg 2018; Mantilla 2019; Ozzano 2021). This paper
seeks to address this lacuna in the literature, by exploring how differences in Church–State
relations in Germany and the US have contributed to diverging responses of Christian com-
munities to the populist right. Specifically, this paper examines how structural pressures
and incentives created by the settlement of Church–State relations have encouraged church
leaders to either publicly challenge right-wing populist politics (as in Germany) or silently
condone it (as in the US), and how these dynamics may, in turn, have shaped the attitudes
of Christian voters in the pews.
The selection of Germany and the US as case studies has been inspired by a “most
similar and different outcome” approach (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Both countries are
Protestant-dominated but multi-denominational western democracies that have recently
experienced the rise of powerful right-wing populist movements and a resurgence of
religious references by these movements (Pollack and Rosta 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin
2018). Moreover, research has shown that under the surface of religious references, right-
wing populist movements in both countries appear often more driven by secular right-wing
identity politics and a civilisational rejection of Islam than by traditional religious or moral
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concerns (Brubaker 2017; Thielmann 2017; Haynes 2019; Cremer 2021a; Elcott et al. 2021;
Ozzano 2021). However, American and German Christian communities significantly
diverge in their reaction to these developments with overwhelming support of Christian
voters for Donald Trump in the US (Whitehead and Perry 2020), and a comparative religious
immunity to right-wing populism among German Christians (Siegers and Jedinger 2020)1.
Empirical support for this research is drawn from a range of sources including quantitative
studies, survey data, and the qualitative analysis of 31 elite interviews with senior church
officials and other faith and civil society leaders conducted in Germany and the US between
2018 and 2021.2
Overall, this article posits that variations in Christian responses to right-wing pop-
ulism between Germany and the US have been influenced by Church–State relations,
insofar as these settlements incentivise Christian leaders to behave differently vis-à-vis
the populist right, which, in turn, influences the behaviour of Christians in the pews.
Specifically, Germany’s church-friendly system of “benevolent neutrality” and formalised
civil religion, appears not only to have encouraged church leaders to speak out against
right-wing populist rhetoric, but also strengthened deference to Christian leaders’ authority
in society by endowing them with a privileged institutional, social and religious status.
As a result, German faith leaders seem to have been able to create powerful social taboos
around the AfD within their congregations. By contrast, America’s informal civil religious
tradition and unregulated religious marketplace, combined with recent trends towards
religious de-institutionalisation and secularisation seem to have facilitated the rise of a
siege mentality in Evangelical circles whilst significantly undermining the status, inde-
pendence and moral authority of America’s religious establishment. This not only had
negative impacts on their willingness to speak out against Trump, but also on their ability
to be heard within their flock even if they did.
The paper is structured in five sections. After contextualising the research question in
this instruction (Section 1), Section 2 briefly reviews the historical background of Church–
State relations in both countries and discusses the constitutional arrangements set out by
the German Grundgesetz and the US Constitution’s First Amendment. Section 3 examines
three key dynamics in which these arrangements have shaped Christian leaders’ attitudes
and strategies towards the populist right in different ways. Specifically, it looks at how
Church–State relations have influenced faith leaders’ self-perceptions within the system
(Section 3.1), their avenues of access to the policymaking process (Section 3.2), and church-
internal power-dynamics (Section 3.3). After having discussed how Church–State relations
influence faith leaders’ willingness to speak out against the populist right through these three
mechanisms, Section 4 examines how Church–State relations impact faith leaders’ ability
to be heard and to shape Christian voting behaviour. The conclusion (Section 5) places
these findings in the context of the academic literature and discusses their implication
for current debates about the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary
western societies.
2. Background: Church–State Relations and Civil Religion in Germany and the US
Within just a few months, the legislatures of both Germany and the US were threat-
ened by an angry mob of far-right rioters carrying Christian symbols. On 6 January 2021,
thousands of pro-Trump protesters stormed the US Capitol, ravaging congressional of-
fices, threatening lawmakers, and sowing death and destruction in the inner sanctum
1 Scholars like Siegers and Jedinger (2020) argue that this “religious immunity” also accounts for part of the AfD’s significantly stronger performance
in East Germany which is significantly more secular than the West. It is also worth noting that the AfD underperforms among similar measure
among Christians across both West and East German states (ibid).
2 The elite interviews for this study were conducted between 2018 and 2021 in a semi-structured fashion. All interviewees were fully informed about
the research project and provided written and/or verbal consent to the use of the material. In addition, each interviewee was sent a list of direct
quotes to be used, providing them with an opportunity to review, retract or anonymize material and provide feedback prior to publication. Ethical
Approval for this procedure was sought from and has been granted by the Cambridge University Department of Politics and International Studies.
To ensure the anonymity of interviewees for this article each interview has been randomly allocated a number (P1–P31) and will only be referenced
as such in the text. For a list of all interviewees cited in this article see Appendix A.
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of American democracy while displaying “Jesus saves” flags and staging sit-in prayers
(Cremer 2021b; Green 2021). Christian symbols like oversized crosses were also present
a few months earlier, in August 2020 in Berlin, when several hundred German far-right
demonstrators attempted to break through police barriers and climbed the entrance steps
to the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament (Bohr 2020). The presence of Christian
symbols in both instances has led some observers to conclude that the protests were driven
by a White Christian Nationalism that was irreconcilable with liberal and increasingly
secular western societies (Althoff 2018; Edsall 2021; Green 2021).
Yet, such accounts often overlook that these instances of anti-democratic violence
combined with Christian symbolism were soon contrasted by very different expressions
of the relationship between religion and politics in both countries. For instance, only two
weeks after the Capitol riots, US President Joe Biden was sworn into office on the steps of
the Capitol on his family Bible in an inauguration ceremony full of religious symbolism
(Cremer 2021b). In his inauguration speech, Biden directly appealed to religious values,
quoted Catholic saints and went on to lead the nation in prayer (Graham 2021). Meanwhile
in Germany, the official national celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of German unity
were held on 3 October 2020 in the form of an ecumenical Christian service in Potsdam’s
famous Garnisonskirche, with the German president, chancellor and cabinet all in attendance
(Bundesregierung 2020).
These latter manifestations of religious symbolism and rhetoric in political contexts
are only two recent expressions of the abiding importance of Germany’s and America’s
civil religious tradition even in times of religious pluralism and secularisation.3 According
to Gorski, civil religion usually has two key functions in a society. On the one hand,
it serves as an integrative force to bridge political, cultural, ethnic, geographical and
linguistic divides and to provide a shared source of cohesion and identity (Bellah 1967;
Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014; P. Gorski 2019, p. 34). On the other hand, civil religion
has often served as a source of “prophetic criticism”, which holds a nation accountable
to its own higher principles and ideals (P. Gorski 2019, p. 34). As we will explore in the
following paragraphs, both the Germany Grundgesetz and the US constitution established
systems of Church–State relations aimed at strengthening civil religion. However, while
similar in their positive appreciation of Christianity’s place in society and their declared
aim to strengthen religious freedom, the US First Amendment and Germany’s system
of “benevolent neutrality”, have set very different incentive and pressure structures for
Christian communities to organize themselves, interpret their relationship with the state
and–critically for this research-respond differently to anti-system populist insurgencies.
To understand these dynamics, this section examines both systems’ historical genesis,
constitutional frameworks and the incentive and pressure structures they produce.
2.1. The German Grundgesetz and the System of Benevolent Neutrality
Contemporary Church–State relations in Germany are largely shaped by the negative
experience of WWII and the wish to formally incorporate Christian values and institutions
as a civilisational anti-dote to totalitarianism (Dipper 2019). Such an interpretation of
Christianity as a bulwark for liberal democracy was no matter of course, as prior to 1945
neither Germany’s Protestant nor Catholic Churches had been particularly enthusiastic
supporters of democracy. German Protestantism, for instance, had been closely associated
with the Prussian throne, and even though most of the Protestant establishment would
have preferred a Kaiser over a Führer, a majority of them still opted for the NSDAP over
the Catholic Zentrum party or “Godless Socialism” in 1933 (Strohm 2011; Scheliha 2019).
Catholics, in whom the decades-long persecution as “enemies of the Reich” under Bismarck
and the Kaiser had instilled a certain suspicion towards the German state, voted for Hitler at
much lower rates, and Catholic authorities remained significantly more critical of the Nazis’
3 Civil religion can be understood as the religiously inspired (but often non-sectarian) creed of common values that undergirds a nation’s politics and
identity (Bellah 1967; P. Gorski 2019).
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racially defined “Positive Christianity” than their Protestant counterparts (Wehler 1994;
Gruber 2006). However, pre-1945, political Catholicism, too, was as Kalyvas and van
Kersbergen put it “largely antiliberal ( . . . ) (and) challenged the ascendancy of liberalism
in Europe from a ‘fundamentalist’ and theocratic perspective” (Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen
2010, p. 185).
Yet, in 1945, as most other pillars of German civil society had either been eradicated
by or fully assimilated into the Nazi state, Germany’s churches still stood out as those
institutions that were perhaps least tainted by Nazism (Ringshausen 2014). This was largely
thanks to the courageous Christian resistance to Hitler from the (minority) Protestant Con-
fessing Church around Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Niemöller (Meier 1984;
Cremer 2019), as well as to Catholic clergy’s abiding reservations and resistance towards
the regime.4 Moreover, the revelation of the Holocaust as well as of Hitler’s plan for an
atheist “final solution of the Church question” (Strohm 2011, p. 7) had also changed atti-
tudes within the churches and contributed to a post-war surge of “Christian Democracy”; a
movement, which, though originally “coined in opposition to liberal democracy” (Kalyvas
and Van Kersbergen 2010, p. 185), now applied itself to the challenge of “how to reconcile
Christianity and democracy” (Müller 2013, p. 245). As a result, when in 1945 the allies
and millions of disillusioned Germans searched for a narrative and connection point to
“another Germany”, Christianity emerged as a positive counterpart to the Nazi era, while
still being rooted in German history and civilisation (Ueberschär 2006; Ringshausen 2014).
This appreciation of Christianity was formalised in Germany’s 1949 constitution: the
Grundgesetz (basic law). “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man” (Grundge-
setz 1949, p. 1), the authors of the Grundgesetz echoed a Christian scepticism for secular
ideology and direct democracy by establishing powerful courts and immutable founda-
tional rights (Pestalozza 1981; Müller 2013; Dipper 2019). In the hope that powerful and
vibrant churches could also help the new Republic to address the dilemma that, in the view
of Grundgesetz’ authors, “the liberal, secularised state lives by prerequisites which it cannot
guarantee itself” (Böckenförde 1991, p. 112), they also created an explicitly church-friendly
system of “benevolent neutrality” (Waldhoff 2013; Dipper 2019). In this system, the new
German state not only guaranteed religious freedom and equal rights for different religious
groups, but also endowed religious institutions with a quasi-public status, collected their
membership contributions through taxes, partly funded faith-run hospitals, schools and
welfare organizations, and enshrined religious education in schools and universities (ibid).
In doing so, the Grundgesetz formalised the expectation that churches, as protagonists of
civil religion, would frame debates, instil social cohesion, foster shared values, virtues and
identity as well as to procure “interior forces of regulation” that would allow the liberal
state to refrain from coercive or authoritative measures (Böckenförde 1991, p. 113).
This formalised arrangement between church and state in Germany has proven to
be a relatively happy alliance over the decades. The churches have enjoyed their constitu-
tional privileges, their high social status as well as the close relations between Germany’s
leading clergy and the political elites (Pollack and Rosta 2017; Dreier 2019). Meanwhile,
the state has relied on the churches to lend legitimacy to the Federal Republic by bridging
public divides, fulfilling social tasks as well as by providing a voice of prophetic criticism
throughout its history (Püttmann 1994). Yet, this arrangement has also shaped the outlook,
structure and behaviour of Germany’s churches themselves. For one, faith communities’
legal status as bodies of the public law, and the collection of their membership contri-
butions through the state in form of taxes, required them to have a formal organisation
with official legal and political representatives, clear hierarchies and official registers of
their members (Czermak 2019). Moreover, this system implicitly endows the German
state with the authority to distinguish between denominations that qualify as “religious
communities” under public law and are therefore deemed worthy of receiving public
4 Which came at the cost that more than half of all Catholic priests in Germany had, in one way or the other, fallen victim to coercive measures of the
regime by 1945 (Hehl and v. Kösters 1984, p. 79).
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support and privileges, and those that are not (ibid). This formalistic approach naturally
incentivises well-established, highly institutionalised and hierarchical churches, whose
teaching closely aligns with the liberal-democratic basic order, set out by the Grundgesetz,
over newer, less hierarchical and more state-critical denominations. By consequent, even
in times of secularisation, it appears to have reinforced the institutional Protestant and
Catholic churches’ status and (self-)perception as the “Godparents” of Germany’s liberal
democratic system—so much to earn them infamous titles such as “system churches” or
“government spokesmen” from the populist right (Thieme and Liedhegener 2015; Kuzmany
2016; Thielmann 2017; Elcott et al. 2021).
2.2. The US Constitution’s First Amendment: Between Civil Religion and America’s Unregulated
Religious Marketplace
In the United States, such a quasi-official legal status and formal political co-optation
of specific denominations would be unimaginable. Governed by the provisions of the First
Amendment that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof”, Church–State relations in the US constitution, were
conceived by the founding fathers as an explicit rejection of the established church-models
of the old world (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). This was partly a result of enlightenment
ideology as well as of the colonies’ own origin as a sanctuary for religious minorities like
Puritans, Quakers, Anabaptists or Mennonites who had fled persecution from established
churches in their home countries (P. Gorski 2019). However, it was also an expression of the
founding fathers’ pragmatic unwillingness to choose an official church on the federal level
in a country that, in 1787, was already religiously highly diverse (Wald and Calhoun-Brown
2014). As a result, unlike the authors of the Grundgesetz, the founding fathers chose not to
officially privilege any specific faith tradition but to establish what Thomas Jefferson in one
of his letters called “a wall of separation” between church and state in the US constitution
(Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014).
However, this did not mean that civil religion was to be any less central and prominent
in the US political system than in Germany’s. On the contrary, from prominent references
to God in the pledge of allegiance, on the US dollar or in presidential speeches, through
Christian symbolism in congressional invocation prayers and during presidential inaugura-
tions, to powerful institutions such as the annual National Prayer Breakfast, American civil
religion has been a ubiquitous feature of American political life (Putnam and Campbell
2012; P. Gorski 2019). This pervasiveness can largely be explained by the fact, that unlike,
for instance, French laïcité,5 the First Amendment was never designed as a wholehearted
endorsement of secularism, let alone as an endeavour to ban religion from the public
sphere. On the contrary, driven by the concept of a “new covenant” between God and
America, the founding fathers’ vision of the new Republic was not only that of a political
“New Rome” but also of a religious “New Jerusalem” (McDougall 1997; P. Gorski 2019).
Religion in general, and Christianity, in particular, were always seen as positive forces and
indispensable pillars of the new Republic and its “manifest destiny” (Wald and Calhoun-
Brown 2014; P. Gorski 2019; Skillen 2020). However, unlike their German counterparts,
the founding fathers were convinced that “true” religion could best prosper if it was freed
from the stifling influence of the state and could operate in a comparatively unregulated
religious marketplace (Cousins 1958; Finke 1990; Wills 1990; P. Gorski 2019).
By allowing new innovative religious entrepreneurs to challenge traditional churches
and to transform the religious landscape, this model laid the fundaments for what Hatch
called the “democratization of American religion” (Hatch 1989). Proponents of religious
economy theory have argued that, as a result of this settlement, religious life in Amer-
ica was much more diverse, flexible and able to adapt to changing circumstances than
the hierarchical and often state-controlled religious landscape of the old world (Stark
and Iannaccone 1994). For instance, while in Europe industrialisation, urbanisation and
5 Which in its legal basis is, in fact, not too dissimilar from the American Wall of separation (Portier 2016).
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modernisation seemed to undermine the traditional power of the church and fuelled secu-
larisation across societies in the 19th and 20th century, in the US these developments were
often accompanied by religious revivals, in which new religious movements emerged and
prospered (Wills 1990; Putnam and Campbell 2012; McLoughlin 2013; Finke 1990). These
“great awakenings” led, over time, to an ever more diverse and de-centralised marketplace
of hundreds of different denominations and thousands of non-denominational churches
(ibid).
To be sure, this constitutionally encouraged religious pluralism did not prevent re-
ligious strife and discrimination. Religious minorities, whether they be Jewish, Catholic,
Mormon or Muslim, repeatedly experienced that just as early American democracy pro-
vided unparalleled levels of political participation to white males, while excluding black
slaves, native Americans and women; so did the early Protestant vision of American civil
religion allow for religious tolerance primarily for Anglo-Saxon Protestants, but not nec-
essarily for others (Casanova 2012; P. Gorski 2019). As a result, both Catholic and Jewish
faith communities even began, for instance, to adopt “more Protestant” modes of worship
and internal organisation in order to be accepted into American society (Herberg 1983).
Still, the lack of institutionalised privileges for specific traditions created a more flexible
and malleable civil religious tradition, which especially after WWII, made it much easier to
include non-Protestant faiths (Putnam 2016). For instance, in order to rally Americans in a
common crusade against “godless communism”, President Eisenhower, sought to bolster
civil religion by supporting the foundation of the National Prayer Breakfast in 1953, by
adding the words “under God” to the pledge of allegiance in 1954, and by inscribing “in
God We Trust” on the Dollar in 1956. However, he also sought to make civil religion explic-
itly non-sectarian. As Eisenhower put it himself: “Our form of government has no sense
unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is”. Although
this did not mean that post-WWII American religion was without religious substance,6
this statement demonstrated the extent to which the American model of Church–State
relations incentivised flexibility over formality, diversity over authority, and market-forces
over constitutional privileges.
The overall result has been that whereas German benevolent neutrality encouraged the
rise of few highly centralised, hierarchical and comparatively homogenous faith communi-
ties with strong institutions and deference to easily identifiable leaders who were given
financial, legal and political privileges within the public sphere, the First Amendment has
led to an opposite outcome. In the US, we see instead the competition between a multitude
of de-centralised, comparatively non-hierarchical, highly heterogenous and even internally
only loosely connected churches and denominations, that tend to have weak structures
and in which clergy and faith leaders’ security and authority are much more dependent
on the strength and mood of their congregation than on constitutional privileges or their
position in denominational hierarchies (Hatch 1989; Chaves 2011).7 These differences in
institutional structure have had an important impact on Christian communities’ reactions
to the populist right in both countries.
3. How Church–State Relations Affect Elite Responses to Right-Wing Populism
The impact of Church–State relations on German and American Christian communi-
ties’ responses to the populist right is perhaps most directly observable in the way they have
influenced faith leaders’ attitudes and behaviours. The interviews with faith leaders con-
ducted for this research show that while both German and American faith leaders seemed
initially sceptical vis-à-vis the rise of the populist right, they soon began to diverge in
their responses. Thus, in Germany the churches quickly emerged as one of the AfD’s most
prolific public critics, as they clearly positioned themselves in the pro-immigration camp,
6 Indeed, it still re-enforced the “deep-rooted belief in American culture that political and personal virtue should be inseparable” (Sennett 1987, p. 42)
and ensured that the new “American creed” still clearly embraced “Judeo-Christian values” (Herberg 1983, p. 258).
7 Due to the above mentioned “protestantization” of non-Protestant faith traditions in the US, this is even true for traditionally much more hierarchical
traditions such as Catholicism (ibid).
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shouldering most refugee aid in Germany through Christian organisations (Nagel and
El-Menouar 2018; Nagel 2019), and publicly arguing—often with explicit slights directed
at the AfD’s reference to Christian identity—that “our Christian identity is particularly
evident when every person who seeks refuge in our country receives humane treatment”
(Deutsche Bischofskonferenz 2016). German faith leaders also directly attacked the AfD’s
references to religion as “perverted” (Die Welt 2015), condemned AfD rhetoric as “hate
speech” (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz 2016) and declared the positions of the AfD leader-
ship to “stand in profound contradiction to the Christian faith” (Bishop Bedford-Strohm
quoted (Evangelisch.de 2018).8 The interviews conducted for this research confirmed that
this opposition towards the populist right was largely uncontested among clergy. Protes-
tant church authorities, for instance, reported receiving “a lot of feedback from parish
pastors who were grateful that the church is so clearly taking a stance (against the AfD) in
the public sphere” (P1) while Catholic leaders confirmed that in their condemnation of the
AfD they were “in complete agreement with church members, the representatives of the
Catholic associations and organisations as well as the dioceses and the bishops” (P27).
By contrast, just as German faith leaders’ opposition towards the AfD hardened, their
American counterparts’ critique of Trumpism became increasingly muted and isolated. Ini-
tially, even many conservative white Evangelical leaders had followed Mainline Protestant
and Catholic leaders in condemning Trump’s politics and rhetoric. Prominent figures like
the president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Commis-
sion (ERLC) Russell Moore publicly called Trump “an awful candidate” and Christians’
support for him a “scandal and a disgrace”, Evangelicals’ flagship magazine Christianity
Today ran editorials cautioning Christians against voting Trump, and scores of Evangel-
ical leaders signed petitions and open letters to oppose him (Moore 2015; Crouch 2016;
Alexander 2016).9 Evangelical interviewees reported that they did “not remember any
main Evangelical leader being strong Donald Trump supporters early in the primary sea-
son” (P7), while surveys among leading Evangelical clergy showed that the overwhelming
majority of participants favoured candidates like Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz or John Kasich
(NAE 2015). This shared initial scepticism among German and American faith leaders is
perhaps not too surprising, given that right-wing populism’s early core base was to be
found in the (in both country’s increasingly secular) white working-class (Putnam and
Campbell 2012; Wilcox et al. 2012; Dilling 2018; Carney 2019), and that right-wing populist
leaders’ intellectual grounding was located in post-Christian, and at times even neo-pagan,
identitarian thinking (Sedgwick 2019; Cremer 2021c; Elcott et al. 2021).
However, by the end of the 2016 election American faith leaders’ open revolt had
largely faltered and voices like Moore’s or Christianity Today’s became increasingly iso-
lated. Instead, Donald Trump was able to assemble a group of conservative faith leaders
in his “White House Faith Advisory Board” to publicly support him (Fea 2018; P. Gorski
2019). As one conservative Evangelical interviewee described this development:
“What happened is that you gradually got a group of fairly prominent voices and figures-
who are often played up by the media-such as Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell Jr., Eric
Metaxas, Ralph Reed, James Dobson, Tony Perkins, Mike Huckabee, Robert Jeffress, who
spoke up constantly in support of Trump, as people of a Christian faith. Meanwhile, the
counter-voices went quiet. Who is still there criticizing today? I can’t think of many
people. (P29)
The research conducted for this paper suggests that this development was not pri-
marily caused by a shift in American faith leaders’ attitudes towards Trumpism. Certainly,
Donald Trump had explicitly catered to white Evangelical concerns through the selection
8 In a further step, the churches repeatedly banned AfD politicians from speaking at the Protestant or Catholic Church annual assemblies, where the
two great churches’ organise mass gatherings to discuss social issues with politicians of all backgrounds (F.A.Z. 2018; Focus 2016).
9 This initial skepticism within the Evangelical elite was mirrored in the fact that in the GOP early primaries Donald Trump performed best among
those primary voters who never attend church (ca. 60% of whom supported him) whereas he significantly underperformed among frequent church
goers (of whom only about 30% voted for him) (Carney 2019).
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of stalwart Evangelical Mike Pence as his running mate, as well as his promises to install
pro-life supreme justices, relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem and undo the Johnson
amendment (Alberta 2019, p. 326). However, in 2020, almost all US faith leaders inter-
viewed still stressed substantial reservations vis-à-vis Trumpism in their midst. A senior
Catholic leader, for instance, emphasised that “many of the Bishops are more critical of
Trump ( . . . ) and I think members of the active religious communities, like the Jesuits,
the Mercy Sisters etc. are perhaps the most critical of the President” (P2). Similarly, an
Evangelical insider confirmed that privately “all these leaders of what I would call estab-
lishment and mainstream Evangelical organisations are still very much anti-Trump” (P3).
Even members of Trump’s own Faith Advisory board privately admitted their scepticism,
emphasising, for instance, that “there were 16 candidates. Donald Trump was my 17th
choice” (P12). Rather, most US faith leaders stressed structural or strategic reasons—often
directly linked to America’s constitutional arrangement of Church–State relations—as core
drivers of their own or their colleagues’ silence or tacit support for Trump. Three key
factors emerged as particularly important in this context: faith leaders’ self-perceptions
as beneficiaries or losers of the current Church–State system (Section 3.1), the ways in
which they could access policymaking in this system (Section 3.2), and leaders’ level of
dependence on congregations’ and donors’ approval (Section 3.3).
3.1. Faith Leaders Self-Perception in the System
The first key dynamic observed in this context was that even though both German and
US faith leaders largely disagreed with right-wing populists’ nativist and anti-immigrationist
policies, American faith leaders saw Trumpism as a potential ally against what they perceived
as an increasingly anti-religious re-interpretation of the First Amendment by the mainstream
political establishment in recent years, whereas German faith leaders saw themselves as
beneficiaries and defenders of the status quo against the populist revolt.
In the US, scholars have observed that with increasing levels of secularisation, and
partly in response to the politicisation of religion through the Christian right since the 1980s,
there has been an increasingly separationist re-interpretation of the First Amendment, in
particular by parts of the Democratic party in recent years (Putnam and Campbell 2012;
Campbell et al. 2018). In fact, interviewed faith leaders of all denominations and political
orientations lamented that “over the past several decades, the First Amendment has been
applied more and more in a way that is antagonistic toward religion per se” (P28), that it
“is being terribly misunderstood, abused and being used by forces, who define separation
as exclusion” (P14) or even that the current “interpretation of the First Amendment is
similar to the freedom of religion that they had in the constitution of the Soviet Union”
(P16). While some interviewees also stressed that in this context “the persecution complex
is dramatically overdone—sometimes you listen to Christians today and you think they’re
describing life under Nero” (P28), interviewees broadly agreed that many Christians “fear
that the secular world is closing in on them” (P19) and that there was a “growing scare,
and a sense of fear (which) can cause us to defensively turn inward” (P10).
It was against this backdrop that in 2016, once Trump had become the Republican
nominee, many faith leaders appeared willing to enter a transactional bargain with his
movement and to mute their criticism, if, in return, President Trump was to protect them
against secularist re-interpretations of the First Amendment.10 As one interviewee reported,
“Christian support for Trump was less about the core issues of the Trump movement and
mostly about their sense of being under siege and that the stakes are higher than ever
especially on issues relating to religious liberty” (P13). Others added that “a large part of
the explanation is that white Evangelicals came to believe that Trump would bring a gun
to a cultural knife fight” (P29) or that “what we’ve needed against Hillary Clinton was a
warrior” (P23).
10 Trump’s public criticism of the Johnson Amendment appears designed to cater precisely to such concerns about religious freedom and secular
re-interpretations of the First Amendment (Aprill 2018; Alberta 2019).
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Such worries about the First Amendment’s secularist re-interpretation and the subse-
quent consideration of an alliance with right-wing populism in the US, strongly contrast
the sentiments expressed by German faith leaders about the Grundgesetz and the system
of benevolent neutrality. In fact, all of the religious leaders interviewed in Germany had
an overwhelmingly positive assessment of the model. One Protestant leader, for instance,
praised it as “a wonderful system, the best one I know, because it obliges the state to be
neutral and to treat everyone the same, but it also obliges it to support religious community”
(P25). A senior Catholic representative credited it with having significantly “contributed to
the religious peace in our country” adding that thanks to it, “we in Germany do not have a
strong anti-clericalism or anti-Christian attitudes as is the case in other countries” (P31).
Even representatives of the more state-critical free-churches judged that “all in all, I think
that the German way is very good because we manage to rule out both extremes (state
church and strong secularism)” (P20).
As a result, rather than seeing the populist right as a potential ally against a secularist
system, many German faith leaders perceived the AfD’s anti-system stance as the more
important threat to the religion-friendly reading of the Grundgesetz. As one senior Catholic
put it, “the AfD’s position on Church–State relations is extremely problematic. The pro-
gramme and the statements of AfD politicians strongly suggest that they are striving for a
very secularist order and that they do not represent a positive interpretation of religious
freedom as we currently have in Germany” (P17). A senior Protestant cleric concurred
claiming that “just as it became clear in the 1930s that the National Socialists were hostile to
Christianity at the moment when the Christians did not follow their ideology, we already
have tendencies that the AfD is becoming increasingly hostile to the church” (P1). Such
impressions were underlined by academic analyses such as that of Marietta Heimbach
Steins from the University of Münster, who found that the AfD’s manifesto was one of
the most critical of benevolent neutrality in Germany’s party system, because it already
sought to restrict Muslims’ freedom to exercise their religion and may “demand the same
restrictions for other religious communities, including the Christian churches, tomorrow”
(Heimbach-Steins and Filipović 2017, p. 31).11
As a result, whereas the formal separation of the Church and State through the First
Amendment seemed to make American faith leaders open to narratives of siege and
victimhood that went hand in hand with right-wing populists’ critiques of the “system”
and the political “elite”, Germany’s churches’ privileged position in the Grundgesetz and
their formal integration into the political decision-making process appeared to incentivise
senior clergy to closely align themselves with the mainstream political establishment and
to perceive the populist right as a critical threat rather than a potential ally.
3.2. Access to the Policymaking Process
Another critical way in which Church–State relations in Germany may have con-
tributed to a more openly negative Christian response to the populist right is by making
access to policy-making less dependent on personal favours and relationships than in
America’s formally separationist model. Thus, in Germany, the Grundgesetz not only grants
churches symbolic, legal and financial privileges but also formalises their consultation
in important policy-making processes, regardless of which party is currently in power
(Püttmann 1994; Dipper 2019). As a result, during our interviews, the official representa-
tives of the Mainline Protestant, Evangelical and Catholic churches towards the German
federal parliament and government, were unanimous in their positive assessment that
“even if their view is not always followed, the churches and other religious communities
are still heard by all parties” (P4) and that “the churches always have the opportunity to
set their own substantive accents and voice their views” (P6). Interviewees agreed that this
11 In fact, the AfD already demanded to “abolish the remuneration of church-representatives such as Bishops etc. through tax money” (AfD 2017,
p. 45), to end the collection of church taxes through the State, to cut church privileges in education, to sever the personal ties between church and
state, and to shut down church officials’ voices in politics (AfD 2018).
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official and formalised access made Germany’s churches significantly less dependent on
personal access to specific individuals and more willing to criticise politicians publicly.
By contrast, American faith leaders often explained that especially after Trump was
elected president, effectively the only way to influence policy was by informally gaining
personal favour within the White House. One Evangelical leader, for instance, stressed
that “there are people who went on Trump’s Faith Advisory Board and stopped publicly
criticizing, because they want a seat at the table to try to influence the president for instance
on immigration policy, to help him become a little more liberal about it” (P3). Interviewed
members of the White House Faith Advisory Board themselves confirmed that for them
“advising the president is really about being able to contribute in such a way that lives
would be changed” (P15). However, they also noted that this approach came at the price
of muting criticism in public. As one member of the White House Faith Advisory Board
put it:
“You got to praise and encourage publicly ( . . . ) all of us have been able to express a
question or press concern or a warning, but you can only do this if you are in the room.
( . . . ) You want to be in the room ( . . . ) If you’re not in the room, you don’t have any
influence”. (P12)
Certainly, many external observers still cast significant doubts on faith leaders’ actual
influence in the White House. One senior Republican official, for instance, remarked that
“the last time I thought about the Faith Advisory Board was the day it was announced
( . . . ) I’ve literally never heard anyone at the White House raise it in discussions or
conversations” (P21). Others expressed concerns that “the Evangelical Advisory Board has
been more changed by Trump than it has changed him” (P3). Yet, it is also important to
recognise that in America’s system of formal separation, religious leaders who had publicly
criticised President Trump or whose denominations had done so, and who consequently
lost personal favour with the administrations, were left with few alternative ways of
influencing the policymaking process as there were no formalised avenues of access. One
Mainline Protestant leader, for instance, reported that whereas “under Presidents Obama,
Bush and Clinton they frequently invited a cross-section of American faith groups to come
to the White House for everything from celebrations to consultations, for conversations, for
meals, for briefings, under the Trump administration we have no access” (P26). Similarly, a
Catholic leader stressed that there was “not a lot of direct contact between the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and the Trump administration. It’s certainly less
than in the past”. And even Evangelical leaders reported that while the Bush White House
was “friendly to Evangelicals” and while “we even had much more engagement under the
Obama administration ( . . . ). We don’t get that at all from this (Trump’s) administration”
(P18). Lacking formal access channels for faith leaders to the policymaking process, the
US model of Church–State relations enabled Trump to make political access much more
dependent on personal loyalty than was the case in Germany.
As a result, whereas German faith leaders could rely on their institutions’ formalised
access to the policymaking process, America’s informal relationship between religion and
politics meant that public opposition to the populist right would come at significantly
higher costs in terms of policy influence and access for US faith leaders, thus incentivising
silence or even support for the Trump.
3.3. Church Internal Power Dynamics
However, the interviews suggested that weighing even more prominently on the
minds of faith leaders than concerns about the backlash or lack of access open criticism
may cause with the Trump administration, were concerns about possible repercussions
within faith leaders’ own organisations. Thus, the third mechanism through which Church–
State relations appear to have contributed to divergent responses of German and American
religious communities to right-wing populism is by incentivising different power-dynamics
within Christian communities between leaders, congregants and donors in each country.
Germany’s formalised system of benevolent neutrality, which collects faith communities’
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member dues through the tax system and requires faith communities to have clear formal
hierarchies and representatives towards the state, seems to encourage a more deferential
top-down relationship between church leaders and congregants. It endows leaders ex
officio with high levels of political, theological and financial authority and independence
(Pollack and Rosta 2017), and while it may make Germany’s churches less agile and
responsive to grassroot trends, it also means that these faith leaders can make decisions
and even unpopular public statements with comparatively little need to fear immediate
negative repercussions for their own position (Finke 1990; Stark and Iannaccone 1994).
By contrast, America’s unregulated marketplace of religion, in which church leaders’
prominence, authority and even remuneration are largely a function of their ability to attract
members and donors, produce much more of a bottom-up power dynamics (Hatch 1989;
Dickerson 2013; Smidt 2016). This may help innovative and entrepreneurial new churches
to thrive. However, it also means that faith leaders’ status, independence, authority, and
livelihood are often built on much shakier grounds, making faith leaders more cautious
about making potentially controversial public statements.
The interviews confirmed that these structural differences had a particularly impor-
tant impact on German and American faith leaders’ willingness to speak out against the
AfD or Trumpism. In Germany, for instance, none of the interviewed faith leaders who
had publicly criticised the AfD reported concerns about potential repercussions for them-
selves. This is not to say that these leaders were unconcerned about how their statements
may be perceived in the pews. Some interviewees, for instance, expressed worries that
the outspoken course of the churches may make AfD-sympathetic church members feel
“marginalised and contributed to their radicalisation, which allowed them and the AfD
to present themselves as victims” (P20). Others worried that “we were perhaps too ex-
clusionary and ostracising” (P25). However, such concerns seemed largely motivated by
strategic considerations about how their organisation could best “approach AfD voters
and convince them of the truth of our own message” (P6), or how the church could “reach
out in the public debate to people who feel attracted by the AfD ( . . . ) so that they do not
see right-wing populist events as the only space in which they can express their concerns”
(P1). By contrast, interviewees were unconcerned about their own position. The decision to
oppose the populist right in principle remained largely seen as a prerogative of the Church
leadership and determined by theological and philosophical disagreements with the AfD’s
politics (Elcott et al. 2021).
By contrast, American faith leaders stressed that concerns about negative reactions
from donors or congregants and their repercussions for faith leaders’ own position, often
trumped theological or political concerns when considering whether or not to speak out
about Trumpism. One interviewee, for instance, reported that “many leaders of Christian
colleges, who are privately critical of Trump, are not weighing in because of their donors,
who hate the people who hate Trump” (P29). Another prominent Evangelical leader
emphasised that: “it’s very difficult for Evangelical clergy to speak up, particularly if
you are compensated within these systems, if your livelihood depends on it. So, self-
preservation is why these (anti-Trump) voices have quieted” (P9).
Several indicators suggest that such concerns are not unfounded. There have, for
instance, been prominent attempts to oust ERLC president Russell Moore from his posi-
tion, based on allegations that his willingness to publicly condemn Trump may cost the
Southern Baptist Convention donations from Trump supporters (Blair 2018; Smietana 2021).
Interviewees emphasised that such developments on the national scale mirrored those on
the local level. One Evangelical leader, for instance, reported that “many religious leaders
in conservative churches, who opposed Trump were very quickly marginalised to the point
that, if they were pastors, many of them lost their churches, or if they kept their churches,
they lost large portions of their congregation” making “most conservative clergy who are
opposed to Trump so fearful of taking a stance against Trump that we don’t know who they
are” (P24). In fact, surveys show that half of American pastors felt limited in their ability to
speak out on moral and social issues, that only one in five (21%) felt comfortable speaking
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out about specific political actors, and that this hesitancy has significantly increased since
the rise of Trumpism (Barna 2019).
These findings from the German and American case studies underline the importance
of structural factors in incentivising some faith leaders to speak out, but others to remain
silent even if they are privately opposed to right-wing populist rhetoric and policies. More
specifically, Germany’s system of benevolent neutrality, which formally integrates churches
into the policymaking process and favours clear hierarchies and centralised structured,
appears to provide faith leaders with greater incentives to defend the current system
against populist attacks, as well as with the institutional basis to do so without the need to
fear major political, social or financial repercussions. By contrast, in America’s unregulated
marketplace of religion, faith leaders not only think that they have less to gain from
protecting a status quo, which they perceive as increasingly secularist and threatening. But
open condemnation of the populist right is also seen to be associated with significant costs
in terms of access to the policymaking process and faith leaders’ own institutional, social
and financial position. As a result, the German system of Church–State relations appears to
encourage church leaders to speak out more freely against the populist right, while the US
separation of church and state seems to encourage many faith leaders to remain silent or
even to support Trump.
4. Direct and Indirect Influences of Church–State Relations on Christian
Voting Behaviour
Church–State relations’ impact on faith leaders’ behaviour can have important knock-
on effects on their communities’ responses to right-wing populism more broadly. There is
a growing scholarly literature on the importance of elite actors in creating social taboos,
which shape political behaviour in general, and voters’ reaction to right-wing populist
movements in particular (de Jonge 2019; Douglas 2003; Haidt 2012; Kaufmann 2018).
The logic here is that by speaking out unequivocally and publicly against right-wing
populism, elite actors can raise the social cost of association with the populist right, thus
discouraging voters from electorally supporting these parties even if they agree with some
of their policies. For instance, scholars have shown that elite actors in mainstream parties
or the media were central in creating and maintaining social taboos around right-wing
populism through a cordon sanitaire of non-cooperation or non-reporting (de Jonge 2019;
Heinze 2018). Church leaders often play a similar role within congregations, where social
taboos can, moreover, be particularly powerful, because of religious institutions’ traditional
role in defining social norms and because research suggests that religious individuals tend
to be more susceptible to social taboos than many of their secular neighbours (Haidt 2012).
Indeed, there is some evidence that in Germany, Christian voters’ comparative “reli-
gious immunity” to right-wing populist appeals is importantly shaped by Church leaders’
willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the AfD (Cremer 2018; Siegers
and Jedinger 2020). As Andreas Püttmann, a prolific Catholic commentator put it: “the
(German) churches have managed to maintain a moral high-ground, which has largely
crumbled in the secular context, where everything seems relative” (Interview Püttmann
2018). As a result, “sermons from the pulpit or public statements (from church leaders)
play an important role in maintaining a social taboo against the far-right” (ibid). This
could also help account for the AfD’s comparatively strong performance in East Germany,
where after 52 years of atheist Nazi and Communist dictatorships levels of secularisation
are among the highest in the world, religious institutions are significantly weakened and
the sway of religious leaders much more diminished than in West Germany (Siegers and
Jedinger 2020). While there is growing empirical evidence to support this claim in Germany
(Cremer 2021a; Elcott et al. 2021), there are is also some research, showing US faith leaders’
potential influence on congregants’ political attitudes and behaviour. Studies show, for
instance, that church attendance can have moderating effects on congregants’ views on
race relations, immigration and even on domestic violence, which can partly be traced back
to faith leaders’ influence (Ellison et al. 2007; Wilcox et al. 2012; Ekins 2017; 2018; Carney
2019). These dynamics may also have contributed to Trump’s initial underperformance
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among frequent churchgoers in the 2015/2016 GOP primaries (Carney 2019). Yet, if a social
taboo existed in 2015/2016 in the US, Trump’s record performance among white Christians
in 2016 and 2020 suggests that it has since eroded (Smith and Martinez 2016; Newport
2020). This is likely partly the result of American church leaders’ comparative lack of
willingness to speak out against the populist right for the structural reasons discussed above.
However, in addition to this indirect impact of Church–State relations on Christian com-
munities’ responses by means of shaping elite-actors willingness to speak out, the structure
of Church–State relations may further amplify such dynamics directly, by either boosting
or undermining deference to faith leaders, thus also shaping their ability to be heard.
For instance, Germany’s centralised and formalised system of benevolent neutrality is
likely to boost church leaders’ ability to influence voters within their churches and beyond,
by clearly identifying church leaders, raising their social status and authority, and providing
them with a prominent platform in the German public sphere (Pollack and Rosta 2017).
Thus, German interviewees confirmed that even in times of secularisation and religious
pluralism thanks to such structures deference to “the moral leadership in the Church is very
important. There are no anti-elitist motives in the Church ( . . . ) In this regard, the episcopal
faith of Protestants is no less pronounced than that of Catholics” (P11). Others stressed the
“continuing social influence and moral authority of the churches” (P25) or observed that
despite broader trends of individualisation and institutional erosion, “it is undeniable that
the authority and clear positioning of the leading clergy leads to many people accepting
taboos in order to belong to the community” (P22). As a result, in the German public
sphere, a small number of institutions like the German Conference of Catholic Bishops and
the Council of the German Protestant Church (EKD) can comparatively authoritatively
“speak for Christianity” in the eyes of the public.
By contrast, America’s unregulated and de-centralized religious landscape, which
evolved under the First Amendment, creates no authoritative figures who ex officio could
speak with the same authority for Christianity in the US (Wuthnow 1988; Stark 1999;
Putnam and Campbell 2012). Instead, US interviewees stressed that even though an
overwhelming majority of America’s religious “establishment” were critical of Trump, and
even though many of them initially spoke out against him, the historical lack of hierarchy
between and within American churches meant that their voices were often drowned out.
Instead, those, who like the members of the White House Faith Advisory Board may lack
institutional or denominational standing, but “are often played up by the media ( . . . ) and
speak up constantly in support of Trump, as people of Christian faith” (P29) often had an
outsized influence on perceptions of Christians in the pews. One senior denominational
leader stressed, for instance, that “the coterie of Christian leaders who surround President
Trump and strikingly defend him, combined with the silence from most Christian leaders
at the local and national levels has led some to believe that the churches ( . . . ) support
President Trump. But that’s not true” (P26).
This challenge to denominational faith leaders’ authority appears to be further exacer-
bated by the accelerating crisis of denominational hierarchies and institutions in America
as secularisation progresses (Olson 2008; Campbell and Putnam 2011; Chaves 2011; Putnam
2016; Bruce 2019; Levin 2020). One Protestant leader hence explained that “one of the
explanations for Trump’s success” was that especially among Protestants “the big story
in American religion is the collapse of the denominational traditions and the decentrali-
sation of religion in America” (P13). Other leaders concurred adding that “with regards
to Evangelical faith leaders there really isn’t a Billy Graham right now, so it’s a little bit
more diffused as to who the leaders of faith are” (P5), and that nobody knows “who
is the most prominent Mainline Protestant leader these days” (P29). The fact that even
interviewed representatives of America’s Catholic church emphasised that episcopal and
papal authority were more limited in the US context and that, for instance, an “Archbishop
has very limited authority over local congregations unless it’s a matter of faith or morals”
(P8) suggests that such dynamics are not just a result of Protestant theology in the US,
but a structural characteristic of America’s religious landscape accelerated by trends of
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secularisation and de-institutionalisation (Hatch 1989; Putnam and Campbell 2012; Carney
2019; Levin 2020).
Whereas Germany’s constitutional arrangement of Church–State relations seems hence
to have significantly strengthened faith leaders’ authority and ability to create social taboos,
the American arrangement appears to have had the opposite effect, thus contributing to the
erosion and even reversal of social taboos against right-wing populism among American
Christians (Siegers and Jedinger 2020; Whitehead and Perry 2020).
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, the findings from the German and American case studies allow us
to discern several key lessons about the ways in which Church–State relations influence
Christian responses to right-wing populism. First, that even though different settlements
of Church–State relations may be designed with similar intentions—that is in the German
and US cases with the aim to strengthen religion as a pillar of liberal democracy—they
often exercise opposing incentives and pressure structures on Christian communities as
they confront right-wing populist movements. Second, that the effects of these different
and pressure structures are often most directly felt by faith leaders, whose response to
right-wing populism in Germany and the US appeared importantly influenced by the insti-
tutional settlement of Church–State relations. Specifically, Germany’s model of benevolent
neutrality, which favours clear hierarchies, centralised structures and formally includes
German faith leaders in the policymaking process, seemed to give clergy greater incentives
to defend the status quo against populist attacks from the AfD, while also equipping them
with the institutional basis and social prestige to do so without needing to fear major
repercussions. By contrast, America’s formal “Wall of Separation” and unregulated reli-
gious marketplace, which is more conducive to flat hierarchies, de-centralised churches
and informal access to policymaking, appears not only to have facilitated the rise of siege
and victimhood narratives among some Christian leaders, thus making them less likely to
publicly defend the status quo. But by making faith leaders more depended on personal
relations for political access, and on donors and congregants for their livelihood, it has
also raised the potential risks for faith leaders to condemn Trumpism—especially at times
when Donald Trump was in office and secularisation and de-institutionalisation already
undermined deference to Christian leadership in the US. Third, this research suggests that
by ways of shaping faith leaders’ willingness and ability to create social taboos against the
populist right Church–State relations can also importantly influence the voting behaviour
of Christians in the pews. Thus, Germany’s centralised system of benevolent neutrality
appears not only to have encouraged the leadership of the Protestant and Catholic churches
to be more outspoken against the AfD, but also to have boosted their ability to maintain
social taboos against the AfD by enshrining their status as foremost representatives of
Christianity in German society. By contrast, America’s decentralised, non-hierarchical and
pluralistic system, produces less deferential authority structures. Instead, the decentralised
structure of denominations, as well as the prominence of non-denominational leaders,
appeared to significantly undermine the traditional religious establishments’ sway over
voters and their ability to create and maintain taboos around Trumpism.
These empirical findings are of some relevance for academic debates about the rela-
tionship between religion and right-wing populism in western democracies. For one they
help us to better understand variation in Christian responses to right-wing populism across
different countries and to reconcile seemingly contradictory interpretations of Christianity
as either a fuel or a barrier to right-wing populism in western countries (Siegers and
Jedinger 2020; Whitehead and Perry 2020; Elcott et al. 2021). Thus, instead of an inherent
ideational nexus between conservative Christianity and right-wing populism, this research
suggests that under the surface of varying Christian electoral support for the AfD in Ger-
many and Trumpism in the US, Christian leaders in both countries were overwhelmingly
critical of what appears to be a largely post-Christian populist right. However, while
these findings lend support to the hypothesis that the new populist right is fundamentally
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distinct from the traditional religious right (Marzouki et al. 2016; Roy 2019; Cremer 2021c),
this paper raises new questions about the conditions under which faith leaders’ scepticism
translates into open opposition or even “religious immunity” and when they may enter
transactional alliances with the new right. Adding to the growing academic debate on elite
actors‘ responses to the radical right, this research stresses the importance of structural and
institutional factors on elite actor behaviour, and their ability to shape grassroot behaviour,
especially in times of secularisation and de-institutionalisation (Heinze 2018; de Jonge
2019). More broadly, this paper raises questions about how secularisation, the crisis of
institutions, and the erosion of deference to traditional authorities in western societies have
contributed to the rise of right-wing populist movements and how legal and constitutional
arrangements may either accelerate or slow down this process (Hatch 1989; Finke 1990;
Stark and Iannaccone 1994). This is by no way to suggest that Church–State relations
alone are deterministic of faith communities’ responses to right-wing populism. On the
contrary, the cases of Germany and the US show that factors such as levels of secularisation,
theological traditions and party systems play an equally important role, and it remains to
be tested how the influence of Church–State relations interacts with such factors across
different countries. Nonetheless, the findings of this research show that even in times
of secularisation and institutional erosion, Church–State relations can have an outsized
influence not just on how faith communities engage in the public sphere, but also on how
religious symbols and language are used in politics more broadly. At a moment when
western countries face the question of whether Christianity remains a source of an inte-
grative, prophetic and pro-democratic civil religion as envisaged by the Grundgesetz and
the US constitution; or whether its symbols become emblems of a new populist right, as
epitomised by their presence at the storming of the US capitol and the German Bundestag,
such insights will become even more important.
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Appendix A
Table A1. List of Interviewees.
Code Position Date Place
P1 Senior cleric of the German ProtestantChurch 13 August 2018 Berlin
P2 Senior cleric of the Catholic Church in theUnited States 6 November 2019 Detroit, MI
P3 Prominent Evangelical leader in the UnitedStates 13 February 2020 Wheaton, IL
P4 Senior official of the Council of theEvangelical Church in Germany 25 July 2018 Berlin
P5
Former member of the U.S. Congress and
former co-host of the National Prayer
Breakfast
5 February 2020 Washington, DC
P6 Senior official of the Catholic Church inGermany 29 August 2018 Berlin
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Table A1. Cont.
Code Position Date Place
P7 Prominent Evangelical leader in the UnitedStates 9 November 2019 Phone Call
P8 Senior official of the Catholic Church in theUnited States 8 November 2019
Philadelphia,
PA
P9 Former official of the National Associationof Evangelicals i 27 November 2020 Alexandria, VA
P10 Senior representative of the SouthernBaptist Convention 27 February 2020 Washington, DC
P11 Senior official of the Council of theEvangelical Church in Germany 2 August 2018 Berlin
P12
Member of President Donald Trump’s
White House Evangelical Faith Advisory
Council
26 November 2020 Phone Call
P13 Prominent Mainline Protestant keader in theUnited States 8 January 2020 Washington, DC
P14 Prominent Pentecostal leader in the UnitedStates 16 October 2019 Phone Call
P15
Member of President Donald Trump’s
White House Evangelical Faith Advisory
Council
26 February 2020 Phone Call
P16 Senior cleric of the Catholic Church in theUnited States 6 November 2019 Chicago, IL
P17 Senior official of the Catholic Church inGermany 26 June 2018 Dresden
P18 Prominent Evangelical leader in the UnitedStates 4 Februrary 2020 Washington, DC
P19 Prominent conservative commentator in theUnited States 7 January 2020 Washington, DC
P20 Representative of the German EvangelicalAlliance 28 August 2018 Berlin
P21 Senior GOP official 22 November 2019 Washington, DC
P22 Representative of the Federal Agency forCivic Education 20 August 2018 Berlin
P23
Member of President Donald Trump’s
White House Evangelical Faith Advisory
Council
14 February 2020 Phone Call
P24 Senior Pentecostal cleric in the United States 5 February 2020 Phone Call
P25 Senior representative of the GermanProtestant Church 7 August 2018 Berlin
P26 Senior representative of the NationalCouncil of Churches 7 November 2019 Washington, DC
P27 Senior representative of the Catholic Churchin Germany 24 August 2018 Berlin
P29 Prominent conservative commentator in theUnited States 14 November 2019 Washington, DC
P30 Catholic Public Intellectual in Germany 9 August 2018 Bonn
P31 Senior Cleric of the Catholic Church inGermany 7 September 2018 Munich
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